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ant Croatoslavia, politically, economically and culturally
attractive to all Southern Slavs, including those still under
Ottoman sovereignty. All of this was to have been sanc-
tioned under a direct arrangement with the Austrian Crown
without Hungarian co-tutelage.
7 - Josip Juraj Strossmayer (1815-1905), bishop, patron
of the arts, chief donator of the Yugoslav (today Croatian)
Academyof Sciencesand Arts; advocated federalism within
the Monarchy, the strengthening of ecumenism, and closer
ties between all, especially the South, Slavs.
8 - Frano Supilo (1870-1917), publicist and politician,
member of the Yugoslav Committee formed abroad dur-
ing World War I; advocated a broadly federalist Yugosla-
via.
- Stjepan Redic (1871-1928), leader of the Croatian Peas-
ant Party, the most important political grouping between
the two world wars; died of wounds sustained in an assas-
sination attempt in the Belgrade parliament.
9 The foreign policy of Dubrovnik aimed at maintaining
good and peaceful relations with all neighbours, and with
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more distant protectors of its free trade, such as Venice
and Istanbul.
10 Count PetarZrinski (1621-1671), Ban, military leader
in the Thirty-Year War against the Turks, disappointed with
the terms of the Vasvar Peace, which did not provide for
the restitution of Croatian and Hungarian lands, consid-
ered a more direct settlement with Turkey, on more
favourable terms for Croatia.
11 See note 6.
12 See note 8.
13 -Vlatko Macek (1879-1964), succeededStjepan Radic
at the head of the Croatian Peasant Party; negotiated an
agreement with the government in Belgrade on the cre-
ation of a large autonomous Banate of Croatia, with parts
of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
- Josip Broz Tito (1892-1980), communist fighter against
the German and Italian occupation, military leader, states-
man; severed the ties with Stalin; co-founder of the non-
aligned bloc.
Economic and Social Cohesion Policy
and Enlargement of the EU
graphical and economic balance in the EC in
favour of low-income Mediterranean countries.
The German unification, furthermore,
brought into the EC East Germany with a popu-
lation of some 16 million and a per capita GDP
some 30% of that of West Germany or 60% of
that of the level of Portugal.
The 1995 enlargement, involving the entry
of Austria, Sweden and Finland, on the contrary
entailed the addition of high-income countries of
Northern "obedience" and thus, to some extent,
re-established the North-South equilibrium exist-
ing among the original Six.
In 1994 the level of GDP per capita within
the EU, converted at current rates of exchange,
ranged from about 7,000 ECU in Greece and
Portugal to some 25,000 in Denmark (and even
more in Luxembourg), corresponding to a spread
of about 1:3.5. Enlargement of the EU to include
the ten CEECs would, first and foremost, entail a
pronounced rise in income differentials within the
Union.
Jorgen Mortensen
INCOME DIFFERENTIALS IN THE EU IN THE
PAST AND IN THE FUTURE
At the time of the first enlargement of the
European Community, in 1973, the original six
member states constituted a relatively closely knit
and homogeneous trading zone. GDP per head
of population (in purchasing power standards) in
Italy stood only some 20% below that of the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany, with Belgium, France
and the Netherlands within this range and only
Luxembourg substantially above the FRG.
The 1973 enlargement entailed the entry of
two newmember states (Denmark and the United
Kingdom) with per capita GDP close to the me-
dian of the founding members and one new mem-
ber state (Ireland) with a per capita GDP only
about 50% of that of Germany and 60% of that
of Italy.
In 1981 the then nine EC member states
were joined by Greece with a per capita GDP close
to that of Ireland and in 1986 by Spain and Portu-
galwith a GDP level respectively somewhat higher
than and somewhat lower than that of Greece.
The two latter enlargements, involving three coun-
tries with a total population of 58 million, conse-
quently resulted in a significant shift of the geo-
Among the candidate countries only
Slovenia has an income level comparable to that
of Greece and Portugal. In fact, at some 6,000
Graph 1: GDP per capita, ECU, 1994
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ECU, the level of GDP per head of population in
Slovenia in 1994 was only some 15% below that
of Greece and rising fast.
In a ranking of the CEECs according to
nominal income per capita, Hungary would come
second, followed closely by the Czech Republic.
In these two countries the level of per capita GDP
in 1994 amounted to some 3,500 ECU, or about
50% of the level in Greece and Portugal.
Further down the scale, Poland and
Slovakia in 1994 recorded a per capita GDP of
some 2,000 ECU, or less than a third of the level
of Greece and Portugal. As for the remaining
group of countries, that is the Baltics, Bulgaria
and Romania, the level of their per capita GDP
was around 1,000 ECU, or only one seventh of
the level in Greece and Portugal.
Enlargement of the EU towards the east,
could thus, if the five CEECs with the lowest per
capita income were included in the first wave, re-
sult in an increase in income differentials among
member states from 1:3.5 as indicated above to
some 1:25 in the enlarged EU.
The data on per capita income presented
above are obtained by converting national ac-
counts data using the current market rate of ex-
change between the ECU and the national cur-
rency. However, as frequently underlined by ana-
lysts, international income comparisons using
market rates of exchange take account only of the
international purchasing power of the currencies
concerned. However, in low-income countries the
prices of domestically produced goods and ser-
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vices are almost always lower, relative to the prices
of internationally traded goods and services than
in high-income countries.
As an example let it be assumed that for
the price of a camera one may get, say, ten hair
cuts in Germany and fifty hair cuts in Romania.
Barbers' services cannot be exported and there-
fore do not influence the exchange rate (at least
not directly). On the other hand, since the num-
ber of hair cuts which can be consumed is limited,
the relatively low price for hair cuts is a direct
benefit for Romanian consumers which must be
taken into account in international real income
comparisons. In order to provide data on price
differences, international organizations undertake
surveys of prices for comparable goods and ser-
vices and produce an aggregate index for the over-
all price level in a country, using the weights (the
basket) of a reference country, normally (but not
exclusively) the United States or the European
Community. The ratio between the two price lev-
els thus can be interpreted as a pseudo-exchange
rate and is therefore termed "purchasing power
parity".
The difference (or ratio) between the mar-
ket rate of exchange and a measure of purchasing
power parity is frequently taken to be a crude
measure of over, respectively under, valuation of
the currency in question.
However, as indicated above and under-
lined by the leading researchers in the field of in-
ternational comparisons of real income (notably
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Summers and Heston), the difference between the
two measures is determined not only by possible
over/under valuation of the currency but also by
the relative price differences between internation-
ally traded and domestically traded goods and
services.
As a consequence of this difference with
respect to relative prices, income levels in low-
income economies expressed in purchasing power
standards (converted at purchasing power parity)
are normally substantially higher relative to those
of high-income economies than income levels ex-
pressed in common currency terms (converted at
market rates of exchange).
As corollary of this, the difference (ratio)
between the market rate of exchange and the pur-
chasing power parity is determined not just by
possible over/under valuation of the currency but
also by the income level of the country concerned.
This feature is illustrated in graph 2 cover-
ing the ten CEECs, the fifteen EU member states,
United States and Japan.
As seen, there is a clear negative correla-
tion between the figures on the x-axis indicating
the income level, as measured by the log of data
on ECU per capita, and the figures on the y-axis,
indicating the ratio between the market rate of
exchange and the purchasing power parity. (Data
are obtained partly from the OECD as far as
CEECs are concerned and partly from the
Commission's (DGII) data base as far as the EU,
US and Japan are concerned.) In fact, the lower
the level of income, the higher is the market rate
of exchange relative to the purchasing power par-
ity. To take an example: while for the UK the
market rate of exchange (£ per ECU) in 1994was
quite close to the purchasing power parity, for
Romania the market rate of exchange was about
three times the purchasing power parity. Conse-
quently, the Romanian per capita income ex-
pressed at purchasing power parity was three times
higher than the per capita income expressed in
ECU at the current rate of exchange.
The line drawn in the graph results from a
regression with the level of income in purchasing
power standards as the independent and the ra-
tio between the rate of exchange and the purchas-
ing power parity as the dependent variable. As
suggested the correlation is quite convincing with
an R2 of 0.78. Observations lying above the line
indicate a higher level of the ECU/PPP ratio than
the one corresponding to the level of income, sug-
gesting therefore a possible undervaluation of the
currency. Observations lying below the regression
line, on the contrary, could be interpreted as in-
dicating an overvaluation of the currency.
Due to the systematic difference between
the purchasing power parity and the market rate
of exchange, there is also an equally systematic
difference between the income per capita calcu-
lated in nominal ECU (or USD) terms and the
income per capita calculated in terms of purchas-
ing power parity. As illustrated in Graph 3, the
real income of the various countries considered
here when expressed in Purchasing Power Stan-
dards (PPS) shows substantially smaller discrep-
ancies between low- and high-income countries
than when expressed in ECU terms. However, it
should, once again be stressed that income data
based on PPS provide a more appropriate indica-
tor for the domestic purchasing power of the cur-
rency of the country but not for the international
purchasing power. Moreover, contributions to the
EU's budget and other transactions between a
member state and the Union are always based on
the nominal national accounts data and converted
at the market rate of exchange for the ECU. This
aspect, though technical in nature, is highly rel-
r
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Graph 3: Per capita income
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evant for calculating both the contributions from
the member state to and the domestic currency
value of transfers and subsidies received from the
EU's budget and well as the domestic currency
value of loans from abroad, etc.
IMPLICATIONS OF ENLARGEMENT FOR THE
EU's STRUCTURAL FUNDS AND THE NEW MEM-
BER STATES
At its Madrid 1995 meeting the European
Council established the following principles for
the application of structural and cohesion funds
in the perspective of enlargement:
"1. The objective of strengthening the eco-
nomic and social cohesion, as laid down in article
B of the Common Provisions of the Treaty on
European Union, continues to be a fundamental
element of EU policy.
2. There must be a guarantee for the poorer
member states on the continuation of solidarity,
although its application should take account of
the success achieved in economic and social co-
hesion. The general application of the cohesion
policy throughout the Union should be main-
tained, even if there is a need to concentrate fund-
ing on specific regions or policy priorities.
3. Improvement and a revision of cohesion
policy is necessary, as it needs to become more
effective. The Cohesion Report, which the Com-
mission will establish in 1996, in accordance with
article 130B of the Treaty, will provide a basis for
the review. The reform of cohesion policy within
the 15 member states, which is to follow, should,
however, take place in an acceptable time period.
4. During a time when most member states
are going through a period of rigorous budget
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management in order to maintain or fulfil the
Maastricht criteria, the Union should also pro-
vide a clear signal that it shapes its policies in a
way that the principle of budget discipline is con-
cretely respected.
5. While the objective should be full appli-
cation of cohesion policy to new member states,
transitional arrangements after accession will be
necessary to integrate them gradually into the
policy and its financial aspects.
6. While implementing the structural funds
in the CEECs, the economic effectiveness of trans-
fers must be assured. Experience suggests that
volumes of assistance which are high in relation
to the recipients' GDP are difficult to use effec-
tively, and can even distort their economic struc-
ture. In other words, high volumes of assistance
might pose big problems for the new member
states, as their administrative systems, their ab-
sorptive capacity and their ability for co-financ-
ing the aid might be overwhelmed by the influx of
funds." (Quoted from press release IP/95/1325
from the Spokesman' Service)
These general guidelines from the Euro-
pean Council, thus, state two basic, complemen-
tary principles: first that the principle of economic
and social cohesion should continue to b~ applied
after enlargement but that, second, this applica-
tion must take account both of these countries'
capacity to translate assistance from the structural
funds into a genuine improvement of their growth
potential and of their capacity to re-allocate do-
mestic economic and financial (budgetary) re-
sources in order to be able to provide the required
national co-financing of projects receiving Com-
munity assistance.
Table 1: Financial allocations, Structural Funds, Obiective 1
COUNTRY Objective 1 population Objective 1 Allocation per
000 % not. pop. allocation head, ECU '94
Belgium 1279 12,7 730,0 570,8
Germany 15960 19,7 13640,0 854,6
Greece 10209 100,0 13980,0 1369,4
Spain 23269 59,4 26300,0 1130,3
France 2546 4,4 2190,0 860,2
Ireland 3503 100,0 5620,0 1604,3
Italy 21134 36,4 14860,0 703,1
Netherlands 217 1,4 150,0 691,2
Portugal 9868 100,0 13980,0 1416,7
United Kingdom 3310 5,7 2360,0 713,0
TOTAL EU 91295 26,2 93810,0 1027,5
Source: European Commission (Sixth Annual Report on the Structural Funds)
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The Community's Structural Funds (the
Regional Fund, the Social Fund, the Agricultural
Fund and the Cohesion Fund) according to the
conclusions of the Edinburgh European Council
of December 1992 would for the period 1994 to
1999 (six years) receive budget allocations
amounting to a total of 141 billion ECU, corre-
sponding to some 31% of the total commitment
appropriations for this period.
About 70% ofthe total appropriations ofthe
Structural Funds would be allocated to "Objective
1", i.e. allocated to the programmes aiming at pro-
viding assistance to regions with a low level of in-
come (normally less than 75% of the Community
average). The remaining 30% are allocated to
Objectives 2-5: old industrial areas, long-term un-
employment, agriculture and fisheries.
As shown in Table 1,within the EU regions
with about 91 million inhabitants, corresponding
to 26% of the EU's total population, will, during
the 1994-1999 period, qualify for Objective 1 as-
sistance. However, only three EU member states,
Greece, Ireland and Portugal, qualify fully for aid
under Objective 1under the present financial pro-
gramming. In other member states the share of
population covered by these regional aid
programmes range from zero in Denmark to 59%
in Spain (making the Spanish programme the larg-
est in absolute terms). The highest per capita al-
location is observed for Ireland (1604 ECU per
capita for the sixyears included). For Greece and
Portugal per capita allocations are somewhat
lower, respectively 1,369 and 1,417ECU, presum-
ably due mainly to administrative delays in imple-
menting programmes,
Apart from some financial support through
special Community initiatives (such as for example
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the special programmes for isolated islands) the
three member states where all regions qualify for
objective 1 assistance do not receive aid under the
other objectives. By contrast, even high income
countries such as France and the United King-
dom receive comprehensive financial support
through the schemes in favour of the old indus-
trial areas and/or long-term unemployment (ob-
jectives 2, 3 and 4). Furthermore, due to the ex-
istence even in rich member states of regions with
a comparatively low level in income, Belgium,
Germany, France, Spain, Italy and the United
Kingdom in addition to aid under objectives 2-5,
receive substantial amounts under objective l.
As illustrated above, the next enlargement,
if it were to take place within a foreseeable fu-
ture, would involve the incorporation of a num-
ber of new countries with a level of income sig-
nificantly lower than even the poorest regions in
the existing Ee. The implications of applying the
existing rules for the Structural Funds would, on
the basis of the above figures, entail the granting
of aid amounting to approximately 1,500ECU per
inhabitant of the CEEC countries over a five-year
period, that is some 300 ECU per year. At the
present level of income per capita, ranging from
some 1,000 to some 3,000 ECU, the aid from the
Structural Funds would, thus, other things being
equal, amount to 10-30% of income. Even if such
an amount of aid could be sustained by the
EC<Z146>s budget, transfers from the Struc-
tural Funds of this order magnitude would most
certainly exceed, by a large margin, the absorp-
tive capacity of the receiving country. Firstly, there
would be a limit to the volume of investment and/
or current expenditure of the kind which is sup-
ported by the Funds (investment in infrastructure,
ADDITIONALITY AND CONDITIONALITY AND THE EU's STRUCTURAL FUNDS
The Principle of Additionality constitutes a basic feature of the functioning of the EC's Struc-
tural Funds. According to this principle, the aid received from the Structural Funds is assumed to
come in addition to the financing from local sources. The aid is, thus, assumed to be granted to
projects which would not have been carried out without the aid from the EC's budget. Typically the
aid from the Structural Funds will cover 50% of the total cost of the project. However, in the case
of particularly poor regions and/or socially justified projects the EC's contribution may be as high
as 75%. In other cases, where the social justification is less obvious, the EC's share may be as low
as 25%.
The aid is normally granted on the condition that the EC's rules of competition and free
access to the market of public procurement are respected. Consequently, the projects implemented
with aid from the structural funds are subject to an open and rigorous tendering procedure allow-
ing firms from all EC member states to tender for such projects. Since local firms frequently do not
possess the know-how and the human and financial resources to undertake, say, the construction
of a bridge, a tunnel, to deliver an up-to-date digital switching equipment or install modem sewage
treatment facilities, a high proportion of the aid from the Structural Funds (according to some
estimates up to 60% ) is in reality channelled back to the most advanced member states in the form
of procurement contracts.
Access to aid from EC's Structural Funds under "Objective 1" (the Regional Fund) is open
with a few exceptions of a temporary nature for regions with a GDP per capita, in purchasing
powers standards, is below 75% of the EC's average.
The Cohesion Fund, established by the Maastricht Treaty, provides grants to Member States
with a per capita GDP of less than 90% of the Community average (Spain, Greece, Portugal and
Ireland) which have a programme leading to the fulfillment of the conditions of economic conver-
gence as set out in Article 104c of the Treaty and aiming at avoiding excessive government deficits.
The Cohesion Fund finances two types of projects: environmental projects and projects of com-
mon interest in the area of transport infrastructure. The rate of Community assistance is between
80 and 85% of public or equivalent expenditure. In the event of the Council deciding that an
excessive government deficit exists in a Member State, no new projects or, in the case of large
multi-stage projects, no new stages of a project shall be financed from the Fund for that Member
State.
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equipment, environmental clean-ups, education,
etc.). Secondly, few, if any, of the CEECs would
appear to be in a position to provide the domestic
financial resources required to respect the
(additionality principle), that is, the principle that
the EC support will normally provide only 50%
of the financing of the elected projects while the
recipient country must provide the remaining
50%, either via the general government budget
or via borrowing (see box). Thirdly, a massive in-
flow of money would be likely to create serious
economic and monetary instability, leading to in-
flation, loss of competitiveness and the risk of in-
stallation of a permanent dependency upon EC
aid.
A simple continuation of the economic and
social cohesion according to the lines and prin-
ciples followed in the past, therefore, cannot be
taken for granted. Some of the very basic features
of these policies may, in fact, need to be recon-
sidered in the light both of the budgetary con-
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The risk of serious economic and monetary
instability resulting from an unrestricted applica-
tion of the rules of the EC's Structural Funds
would, furthermore, be aggravated by the simul-
taneous application of the common agricultural
policy (the CAP). Introduction of the present
market arrangements for agricultural products,
even as modified in recent years and in the near
future, could be expected to lead to substantial
increases in prices of agricultural products at the
level of the consumers, resulting in abrupt and
massive changes in relative prices, manifold rise
in land prices, boosting of costs and general price
inflation, etc.
straints of the EU and of the absorptive capacity
of the new member states.
However, assessments ofthe costs and ben-
efits of EU membership for the CEECs should
also take account of the delay which would be re-
quired for the candidate countries to reach the
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level of 75% of the EU's average income (at PPS).
This question will be addressed in the following
section.
I
THE SCOPE FOR AND THE MECHANISMS OF
CLOSING THE INCOME GAP
As shown in section 1, the difference be-
tween the Purchasing Power Parity and the mar-
ket rate of exchange shows a pronounced tendency
to decline as a function of the real income level
(Graph 2). This feature is mainly due to the fact
that prices of internationally traded goods and
services tend to increase to the level prevailing in
the world market while the prices of goods and
services traded only domestically remain deter-
mined by the general level of income and produc-
tivity in the economy.
The splitting-up of the CEEC economy in a
sector which is exposed to competition in foreign
markets (or to competition from imported prod-
ucts) and a sector which, due to the very nature of
the goods and services it produces, has taken place
at a rapid pace after the break-down of the com-
munist regimes. It has entailed huge, and in some
cases chaotic, changes in relative prices between
the twomain sectors and notably in countries which
have been in the forefront in the opening up of
frontiers and in liberalizing capital movements such
asEstonia, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. It has
been less pronounced in countries where the open-
ing up has been more timed such as, notably, Hun-
gary, Bulgaria and Romania.
During the subsequent course of economic
integration and reduction of the degree of real
income divergence, the price relations can be ex-
pected to change again in favour of the (sheltered)
sectors, that is, the prices of domestically traded
goods and services can be expected to rise rela-
tive to the internationally traded goods and ser-
vices. This, in fact, constitutes a mechanism
whereby the domestic (sheltered) sectors are pro-
vided a share in the benefits from trade integra-
tion engineered by the sectors exposed to (and
benefitting from) foreign competition. The de-
tailed implementation of this process will vary
from one country to another depending upon the
capacity to adjustment of the various sectors of
the economy, the influence of monetary and fis-
cal policy, etc. It is, therefore, hardly possible to
predict with a high degree of exactitude the path
of this process.
Nevertheless, an illustration of the link be-
tween real income catching up and the change in
relative prices can be found in the performance
of the Greek and Portuguese economies during
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the process of adjustment of their economies to
the EC's internal market. As far as Portugal is
concerned, its GDP per capita in 1985, just be-
fore joining the EC, in ECU terms amounted to
only 29% of the EC average (excl. ex-GDR).
However, in PPS terms Portugal's per capita GDP
amounted to 53.1% of the EC average; implying
a PPP /exchange rate ratio of 1.82.Ten years later,
in 1995, Portugal's per capita GDP in ECU terms
had increased to 46.9% of the EC average while
in PPP terms it had increased to 67.9. The PPP/
exchange rate ratio had, thus fallen from 1.82 in
1985 to 1.45 in 1995.
Short-term fluctuations of the PPP/market
rate of exchange ratio may be due to other fac-
tors and these figures quoted for Portugal do not
serve as a model but only as an illustration of the
mechanism whereby all sectors in the economy
obtain a share in the benefits from integration. In
practice, however, due to this mechanism prices
and costs in the sheltered sectors tend to increase
faster than the prices in the exposed sectors. The
mechanism could also be reversed in phases where
sectors which hitherto did not participate in the
economic integration are abruptly being exposed
to foreign competition or, alternatively, obtain
access to the world market. The latter could be
the case for agriculture in some of the CEECs such
as, notably, Poland and Romania. Typically, how-
ever, the catching up process for most of the
CEECs can be expected to involve a substantially
faster rise in nominal incomes expressed in ECU
terms than expressed in PPP terms. The corollary
of this, then, would be a faster rise in the GDP
deflator than in the prices of exports and imports
of goods and services. and this process could take
place, it must be stressed, without distorting the
monetary and economic stability of the economy.
(As pointed out by the economists of the
(Scandinavian School) in the 1960s this process
can be expected to continue as long as the pro-
ductivity increases in the exposed sectors are faster
than the productivity increases in the sheltered
sectors. Since the scope for productivity increases
in are likely to be particularly large when hitherto
protected industries are exposed to foreign com-
petition, the mechanism may be particularly pow-
erful in the CEECs with relatively large potential
for income increases through growth in the vol-
ume of exports of goods and services.)
This aspect is likely to be of considerable
importance when tracing the route for integration
of the CEECs in the European economy. As a
general rule of thumb, the speed of catching up
of per capita income in ECU terms will be deter-
Ir
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Table 2: Feature of the catching up process
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Portugal 1985 1995 Change %
Real effective exchange rate 1938 = 100
A: Based on GDP deflator 100 137.2 37.2
B: Based on deflator of exports of goods and services 100 116.5 16.5
C: GDP Deflator/Deflator of exports of goods and services 100 117.8 17.8
GDP per head of population, EUR 15=100
A: ECU terms 29.1 46.9 61.2
B: PPS terms 53.1 67.9 27.9
C: Ratio PPS/ECU 1.82 1.45 - 20.7
Source: Commission services (DG II)
mined by the future productivity increases in the
exposed sectors only, rather than in the economy
as a whole. Using again the illustration of this
mechanism, during the course of the catching up
process the price of a hair cut in Romania will
increase in proportion to the price of most manu-
factured goods. This change in relative prices will
show up as an increase in the consumer price in-
dex over and above the rate of inflation in the most
developed countries. However, it is a result of a
change in relative prices between traded and non-
traded goods and services and will therefore not,
as such, entail a deterioration of the competitive-
ness of the Romanian economy.
In practice, this process of change in the
relative prices will be superimposed on other as-
pects of economic performance, such as monetary
policy, cost developments in the exposed sectors,
etc. The actual economic development and per-
formance of a country will therefore not neces-
sarily correspond to the theoretical pattern out-
lined above. For example, in contrast to the clas-
sical cases of successful catching up, such as Ire-
land and Portugal, the development of Greece
since accession to the EC has, in fact, mainly due
to economic mismanagement by the Papandreou-
regime, entailed both stagnation of the real per
capita income and a decline in nominal (ECU)
income relative to the EC average.
The economic development of Portugal
during the last decades may, as already indicated,
provide a good indication of the potential evolu-
tion of the CEECs, now that they are in the pro-
cess of implementing the free trade arrangements
contained in the Europe Agreements. Since join-
ing the EC, as a reflection of the relative price
changes mentioned above, the Portuguese GDP
deflator, in fact, rose by almost 3 percentage points
faster per annum than the GDP deflator for the
fifteen EC member states on average. Over this
period, however, the deflator of exports and goods
and services rose by about one percentage point
per year more than the EC average, resulting thus
in a certain loss of price competitiveness of Por-
tuguese exports. Adjusting for this effect, never-
theless, the Portuguese GDP deflator could prob-
ably have increased by some two percentage points
more than the EC average, simply due to the
change in relative prices and costs between the
exposed and sheltered sectors and, thus, without
any loss in external competitiveness.
In sharp contrast to Portugal, Ireland, at the
time of joining the EC, had an income per capita
in ECU terms approximately the same as the level
in PPS terms. This may have been due to the fact
that, due to the de facto monetary union with the
UK and to the free movement of labour between
Ireland and the UK, Irish domestic costs and
prices had already moved closer to the UK level.
Consequently, the concept of a (sheltered) sector
had less relevance in the Irish case and the scope
for changes in relative prices between the exposed
and sheltered sectors was more limited. This is
also illustrated by the fact that the Irish GDP de-
flator and deflator of exports and goods and ser-
vices between 1983 and 1995 rose at about the
same rate relative to the EC average.
Using the conceptual framework illustrated
above, it now become possible to establish a sce-
nario for the evolution of the economic perfor-
mance of the CEECs during the period of catch-
ing up to, say the present EC average:
Taking, first, Romania as an example, the
level of per capita GDP in PPS terms in 1995was
only some 21.5% of the EC average of 17482ECU
or 3758 ECU. In order to attain the 1995 level of
per capita GDP in the EC, per capita GDP of
Romania in real terms would thus need to increase
some 360%, corresponding to an annual rate of
increase of 5% per annum for 32 years (or, alter-
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natively, 6% per annum for 26 years). During this
process of increase in real GDP, however, the ra-
tio between the market rate of exchange and the
purchasing power parity would be reduced as a
result of changes in the relative prices between
the sheltered and the exposed sectors. Conse-
quently, the rate of growth of nominal GDP (with-
out any change in competitiveness of the Roma-
nian exposed sector!) could be some 1.4 points
higher than the real rate of growth if the catching
up to the EC average would be obtained over 32
years and 1.7 points if the catching up would be
brought about over 26 years. The speed of catch-
ing up of nominal income would thus be consid-
erably faster than the catching up of real income.
During the course of the period, furthermore, the
rate of catching up would be particularly fast in
the early phase of the process and slow down in
response to a reduction of the income gap.
The catching up scenarios outlined above,
although apparently both highly technical and
highly speculative, have serious implications both
for macro-economic stability, notably the
sustainability of government budget balance and
an external deficit, and for the politics of the en-
largement process in general.
During the next two decades the potential
for expansion of per capita output in the CEECs,
which have a relatively well educated work force
and a culture of production, will be considerable,
probably at least some 5% per annum (The Japa-
nese economy, during the first two decades of
opening up of foreign trade through, notably, gain-
ing access to the US market, experienced an av-
erage rate of growth of labour productivity of
some 10% per year on average. An assumption
of a 5% productivity growth in the CEECs over
the next two decades would, in comparison with
the experience of Japan and other Asian coun-
tries, appear to be on the low side.) Furthermore,
the expansion of output will be accompanied by
an additional 1-2% increase in the GDP deflator
due to a shift in relative prices between the ex-
posed and sheltered sectors. This category of price
increases should, thus, not be interpreted as be-
ing equivalent to general inflation and would in
fact correspond to zero inflation in the most de-
veloped EC countries (where the GDP deflator
and the deflator of exports of goods and services
tend to develop in parallel). The Maastricht cri-
teria would, thus, as far as the rate of inflation in
low-income countries is concerned (The rate of
inflation should not exceed by more than 1.5
points the average of the three EMU countries
with the lowest rate.), appear to be overly strict
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and would need to be adjusted as far as these coun-
tries are concerned.
Also the criteria concerning the general
government budget balance and gross debt would
need to be reconsidered in order to allow the
CEECs to integrate harmoniously into the EMU.
In fact, with prospects for an increase in nominal
GDP in ECU terms considerably above the scope
for (non-inflationary) increase in the EC average,
the CEECs would be in a position to sustain both
a higher budget deficit and a higher external defi-
cit than a high-income member state. (The higher
the growth of nominal GDP, the higher the bud-
get deficit or the external current deficit compat-
ible with a constant level of public and/or exter-
nal debt in proportion to GDP. For example at a
rate of growth of nominal GDP of say 8% per
annum, a deficit of 4.5% would be compatible with
a public debt amounting to 60% of GDP. How-
ever, at a rate of growth of nominal GDP of only
4% per annum the level of deficit compatible with
a constant debt/GDP ratio would be only 3%, etc.)
Due to the prospective fast increase in GDP
in ECU terms during the process of integration,
the contributions from the CEECs, once inside
the EC, would also rise considerably faster than
the contributions from the high-income member
states. In fact, since the EC's own resources and
supplementary contributions are based on nomi-
nal data, such as VAT receipts and GDP expressed
in ECU terms, these items would, on the assump-
tion that the quality of national accounts statis-
tics and the efficiency of tax collection are en-
hanced in line with the growth of incomes, rise in
line with the nominal GDP and expenditure of
the CEECs.
There would, thus, be not only costs but also
considerable gains for the EC in a rapid integra-
tion of the CEECs through the implementation
of the Europe Agreements already in force and
an early membership opening the opportunity for
these countries to participate fully in all aspects
ofEC policies, including the common agricultural
policy. The essential condition for a successful
completion of this process over the coming de-
cades would be for these countries to adopt a
policy aimed at a strict maintenance of macro-
economic stability and to allow only such budget
and external deficits as would be sustainable in
the long run and, in the case of external deficits,
covered by long-term capital imports. Again, the
implementation of such policies would, beyond
doubt, be considerably facilitated by the prospect
of early and full admission into the EC rather than
a long waiting period in the corridors. _
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